An SSMer disputed "the disability/non-ability distinction" (her words) that she noticed in remarks where I had distinguished the variable nature of human fertility which is two-sexed and the constant nonfertility of the one-sexed scenario.
Basically, fertility requires two sexes and so infertility is a disability of reproductive powers of the male-female twosome. On the other hand, the lack of the other sex is not a disabilty because the one-sexed scenario is not fertile (without the other sex, of course) and so it is not rightly described as infertile. Indeed the lack of the other sex is deemed both desirable and definitive of the homosexualized one-sexed scenario that the SSMer had emphasized. That nonfertility is not the moral nor the legal equivalent of infertility.
The distinction is not between disability and "non-disability", anyway.
I think that the SSMer had difficulties thinking clearly about this because of her misuse of the relevant words. It is very likely she has lost the ability to hold certain ideas in her thoughts because she had lost the necessary vocabulary with which to express those ideas. A cloud of confusion does tend to envelope SSMers. At times that is manufactured by their own rhetorical fog machine.
Fertility is an intrinsically variable ability and infertility is the corresponding disability. The nonfertility of the one-sexed scenario is simply an inability that is intrinsic and constant. That is, fertility was not disabled because it was not enabled due to the lack of the other sex. The notion and the fact of fertility/infertiltiy is extrinsic to the one-sexed scenario.
Consider, during a large part of every month, even the reproductively healthy male-female twosome is infertile. In the normal course of things, people start life prefertile, grow into fertility, and mature out of fertility. Men and women vary throughout this very significant life passage. That human generativity is variable is undisputed and in that sense it ought to be unremarkable when discussing eligibility to marry.
The inability -- the inherent nonfertility -- of the entire spectrum of the one-sexed scenarios is constant due to the lack of the other sex. That, too, ought to be undisputed as unremarkable.
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When pressed, the SSMer will agree on both points. But then a stubborn effort to ellide the obvious is embarked upon in a slightly different way which recycles the same basic confusion of categories.
The SSMer clarified that she had meant to compare the homosexual twosome and the heterosexual twosome. But that would just be another way of spinning the one-sexed and the two-sexed scenarios. She was merely choosing to highlight a narrowed subset of each scenario but she did not explain why sexual orientation was relevant to the proposed comparison regarding disability and inability.
If the relevance is found in sexual behavior, then, the distinction I made still applies. Same-sex sexual behavior is definitively nonfertile. That is not a disability. That is an inability.
The sexual twosome that lacks the other sex is not a reproductively enabled unit. It does not become infertile due to ill-health, malformed or gravely injured reproductive anatomy, nor due tonormal human maturation (ie growing old). It is nonfertile, beginning to end, and sexual behavior is irrelevant in this regard.
Obviously. Or one might think.
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The SSMer said she meant to compare like and like. But that did not mean comparing the male-only and the female-only subsets of the homosexual category. No, she meant a different compaison.
She meant to compare the non-procreative type of sexual behaviors within the entire homosexual category and the procreative type of sexual behavior within a narrow subset of the heterosexual category. She was still in search of a disablity that she might claim to be the equivalent of an inability.
In restating her comparison she sneaked in a change in word usage, as often happens in such discussions. She assumed that all sexual behaviors that do not result in procreation may be recategorized as non-procreative types of sexual behavior. That would be misleading.
The way she put it serves to illustrate how her switch in word usage is misleading.
She would compare all the "non-procreative" homosexual couples with the "non-proceative" heterosexual couple whose sexual behavior could not lead to conception. For instance, she said, consider the post-menopausal bride and her groom.
Well, first, the bride and groom's fertility would be disabled. The disability-inability distinction applies to the comparison with all homosexual couples.
Second, the bride and groom's infertility does not render their coital relations non-procreative by type.
To compare like and like, consider the reproductively healthy bride and groom whose coital relations are procreative by type even during large parts of each month during which as a couple they are infertile; up to and after the wife reaches menopause their sexual relations remain procreative by type. This married couple compares with the newlywedded post-menopausal bride and her husband. In both examples the coital relations are procreative by type of behavior. Like and like
It would be a comparison of unalikes to compare the coital relations of either of the bride-groom examples with the non-procreative types of behavior to which the male-only and the female-only homosexual couples are limited.
Sexual behavior does not provide the type of comparison the SSMer had hoped for. It actually showed the significance of sex and behavioral difference rather than the illusion of behavioral sameness.
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But the SSMer would compare the couples rather than the types of behavior. The obvious problem with that is the SSMer has emphasized homosexuality and has presupposed the comparison on the basis of sexual orientation. That is, she has chosen to compare the homosexual and the heterosexual types of relationships and thus the comparison is of the definitive sexual behaviors of each type of reationship.
Remember, the homosexual emphasis is her emphasis and not mine. She has insisted upon it and that is undisputed and, of course, not somethng she might suddenly describe as remarkable when discussing the pro SSM arguments about marriage
Yet the SSMer has not proposed a comparison of like and like. In the first place she has not stated the sexual behavior that she believes to be applicable to both the male-only and the female-only versions of the homosexual scenario. Whatever she'd select as the common behavior between those two versions, it would not be procreative by type, anyway. So the SSMer hurriedly skipped that step because she did not grasp that her comparison was of types of sexual behavior afterall and not a comparison of types of couples.
If she skipped that step deliberately, then, what is the reason? I will leave that for her to say and for readers to ponder.
If the types of sexual behavior are irrelevant to the SSMer's intended comparison, then, her homosexual emphasis is neutralized. That would be her doing and not mine.
That returns us to the broader comparison of the wide range of sexual and nonsexual types of relationships that populate the many one-sexed and two-sexed categories. The ability and inability distinction applies at that level too.
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What the SSMer is really trying to do is to relocate the infertile husband-wife out of the procreative type of sexual relationship and to the margins of the one-sexed category. But that cannot be accomplished without negating the homosexual emphasis. And even at that the distinction she has disputed is still applicable.
Other SSMers have made a similar error in word usage. They would rather compare all homosexual couples to the childless husband-wife. But that is based on their insistence that the lack of a legal requirement forcing married people to procreate can only mean that procreation is irrelevant to marriage eligibility.
The marriage idea does not depend on such a totalitarian use of state power. There are legal requirements in our marriage law that express the two-sexed sexual basis for marriage and that express the orientation of the marital relationship toward responsible procreation.
In addition to the man-woman requirement, see the sexual basis for consummation, annulment, adultery, and the presumption of paternity. These are reasonable requirements. Taken together they reflect societal acknowledgement and endorsement of the social institution that the law reflects and neither created nor owns.
Meanwhile there is no homosexual requirement proposed nor enacted wherever SSM has been pressed into te law. Yet the homosexual emphasis is the supposed source of the pro SSM complaint and the pro SSM demand for remedy.
There is no sexual basis for presuming that co-parenting is a default of SSM to which those who participate give their automatic consent. Likewise there is no sexual basis in SSM law that ties together consummation, annulment, and adultery. These parts of marriage law, we are told, are not significant anyway and must be deeply discounted if not disowned in societal regard for marriage itself. If we take that "assurance" at face value, then, SSMers concede that SSM at law would not be a sexual type of relationship.
They shrug because they mean to pre-emptively recast marriage as the same. That may be the price they assume comes with the SSM project but that aso negates their complaint that the man-woman criterion is discrimation based on sexual orientation. It negates their homosexual emphasis. It would negate marriage as a sexual type of relationship under the law prior to SSM. It would negate the careless claim that their argumentation would not change marriage but merely expand marriage.
It leaves in tatters the SSMer's dispute regarding disability based on comparison of all homosexual couples and this or that heterosexual couple.
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The same SSMer who stumbled over her own feet in her proposed dispute with "the disability/non-ability distinction" has also blatanty told a falsehood when she claimed that I thought procreation was a legal requirement for eligibility to marry.
She has been corrected on that very point in previous encounters so her retelling of that misrepresentation is fairly described a lie told knowingly. This is someone quick to accuse others of lieing but seems oblivious to her own peculiar penchant for speaking deliberate falsehoods.
Those who enter marriage give their consent to the vigorously enforced default that the husband would be the father of children born to he and his wife. That does not make sense in a groomless or in a brideless scenario. But it does makes sense given that coital relations of husband and wife provides the sexual basis for consummation (which seals the agreement to become husband and wife), provision for annulment (the marriage did not exist), and for adultry (grounds for injury and divorce).
Marriage is shaped by and is pointed toward responsible procreation. The procreative type of sexual behavior unites man and woman in their sexually embodied reality and makes of marriage the intimate relationship of now-closely-related kin; and this bodily union -- this sexual type of union -- is entailed in a comprehensive relationship that also features the volitional, emotional, social, and spiritual dimensions of sex integration. It is simultaneously a deeply private relationship and a public relationship deeply-rooted in the two-sexed nature of humankind.
This also illuminates the incest taboo and the concrete way in which unrelated bride and groom become each other's closest kin. I will discuss this aspect more in later blogposts. For now ask yourself, if husband and wife became closest kin via the marital act, why is their subsequent sexual relations not also incestuous? It is not a trick question although to the SSMer it might feel like a mindtwister.
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Anyway, the distinction between ability/disability and inability is significant because the marital relationship is a sexual type of relationship with great societal significance.